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Abstract: 
 
What does it mean to see someone as human, as a member of humankind? What kind of 
call for justice is it to demand that a group be seen as human beings? This article explores 
a fundamental kind of injustice: one of perception and how we respond to our 
perceptions. Drawing on Cavell, Wittgenstein and Rancière we elucidate “soul blindness” 
as a distinct and basic form of injustice. Rancière’s police orders and Cavell’s soul 
blindness are mutually constitutive; the undoing of police orders entails a politics of soul 
dawning.  Soul dawning entails acknowledging the humanity of others without erasing 
difference. In the concluding section we consider white obliviousness to the Black Lives 
Matters (BLM) movement as a case of soul blindness. Part of the political import of 
BLM is its capacity to illustrate how practices of soul blindness in the U.S. constitute 
whiteness in a racialized police order.   
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It is sometimes imperative to say that women or children or black people or criminals are 
human beings. This is a call for justice. For justice to be done, a change of perception, a 
modification of seeing, may be called for. But does it follow that those whose 
perceptions, or whose natural reactions, must suffer change have until that time been 
seeing women or children or black people or criminals as something other than human 
beings? 
-- Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason (1999, 372) 
 
I learned in New Jersey that to be a Negro meant, precisely, that one was never looked at 
but was simply at the mercy of the reflexes the color of one’s skin caused in other 
people. 
  -- James Baldwin, Notes of a Native Son (1965, 77)	
 
 
 
What does it mean to see someone as human, as a member of humankind? What kind of 
call for justice is it to demand that a group be seen as human beings? Cavell argues, and 
Baldwin implies, that justice in these instances requires that those in a hegemonic 
position must change how they perceive, how they naturally (i.e., spontaneously) react, to 
members of such groups. These types of calls for justice are responses to a fundamental 
injustice: one of perception and how we respond to our perceptions. Such injustice 
involves what Cavell calls “soul blindness”. By this term, Cavell means the failure to see 
“others or ourselves as human” not in the sense of homo sapiens as a biological kind but in 
the sense of humanity as an ethical kind (Mulhall 2001, 254).  In this article, we draw on 
the work of Cavell, Wittgenstein and Rancière to elucidate “soul blindness” as a distinct 
and basic form of injustice. Our central thesis is that “police orders” (a term that we take 
from Rancière) and soul blindness are mutually constitutive and, as such, the undoing of 
police orders entails a politics of soul dawning – i.e. of coming to see a person or group 
of people as human. In order to unpack this claim and its political implications, we first 
examine Cavell’s concept of soul blindness in the context of Wittgenstein’s work on 
seeing aspects that frames Cavell’s development of this concept. The second section 
argues that Rancière’s work on politics and police orders can be productively read as 
elucidating the political implications of Wittgenstein’s and Cavell’s work. In particular, we 
	 2 
argue that a politics of soul dawning entails acknowledging the humanity of others 
without erasing difference. In the concluding section we consider white obliviousness to 
the Black Lives Matters (BLM) movement as a case of soul blindness. Our claim in this 
section is that difference blind approaches to politics – as exemplified by political 
responses to #BlackLivesMatter such as #AllLivesMatter – instantiate the very condition 
of soul blindness to which BLM seeks to draw attention. Part of the political import of 
BLM is its capacity to illustrate how practices of soul blindness in the U.S. constitute 
whiteness in a racialized police order.   
 
I 
Wittgenstein initially introduces the term ‘aspect’ and the related terms ‘aspect-
perception’, ‘aspect-dawning’, and ‘aspect-blindness’ to discuss a set of perceptual 
phenomena that develop out of Gestalt psychology (Glock 1996, 36 – 40). The most 
famous of these images is Jastrow’s duck-rabbit; a picture that can be seen as either a 
duck or a rabbit, but never both at the same time. Wittgenstein refers to those types of 
schematic images that can be taken as objects – such as the famous duck-rabbit image, a 
triangle, the three dimensional cube, the black and white cross image – as “picture-
objects” (Wittgenstein 1973, sec. xi 194). These images are of interest because they are 
instances in which we take the image as the object that it pictures. The key discussion on 
aspects in the Philosophical Investigations is in Part II xi whose main concern is with what 
Mulhall labels the “inherent paradoxicality” of aspect-perception (Mulhall 2001, 274): “I 
see that [the face] has not changed; and yet I see it differently” (Wittgenstein 1973, sec. xi 
193).2 Wittgenstein argues that what changes when one perceives a different aspect is 
one’s attitude towards, not one’s opinion about it, the image (1973, sec. xi 205). By 
‘attitude’, Wittgenstein is not referring to a cognitive relation but to a practical relation to 
the picture-object, that is, a relation of practical engagement with, and not simply 
	 3 
knowing or believing or thinking about. In order to explicate this phenomenon, 
Wittgenstein introduces several different terms in the first half of section xi. He describes 
the self-conscious experience of seeing something as something as a case of “noticing an 
aspect” (Wittgenstein 1973, sec. xi 194). Dual or multi-aspect images such as the duck-
rabbit picture draw attention to the fact that our attitude towards such picture-objects 
can change. The thought here is that we can be struck by the dawning of an (new) aspect, 
where ‘being struck’ denotes the suddenness of this manifestation and its natural 
expression in spontaneous avowals such as ‘Now I see it!’  Aspect dawning 
 “is forced from us. – It is related to the experience [of a perception] as a cry is to pain” 
(Wittgenstein 1973, sec. xi 197), it involves standing in practical relation to a picture-
object in terms of the object it depicts, seeing it as something (not merely as marks on 
paper from which we infer a representation of something). Continuous aspect perception 
denotes the readiness-to-hand of the immediate description of the picture in terms of the 
object it depicts or represents, where ‘this readiness-to-hand is a manifestation of the 
perceiver’s taking for granted the identity of what he perceives’ (Mulhall 1990, 23). 
Conversely ‘aspect change’ denotes that form of aspect dawning which occurs when a 
person shifts from seeing a picture-object under one aspect to seeing it under another.3 
Finally, Wittgenstein introduces the term “aspect blindness” (1973, sec. xi 213 – 214) to 
describe someone “lacking in the capacity to see something as something” (1973, xi 213). 
The aspect blind person is unable to experience the picture-object as the thing that it 
depicts. As such, the aspect blind individual is unable either to experience continuous 
aspect perception – i.e. to see a picture-object as something – or to experience aspect 
dawning.4  
 
Wittgenstein’s analysis of seeing aspects is of particular importance for Cavell’s 
subsequent development and investigation of the phenomenon of soul blindness. 
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According to Cavell’s reading, aspect dawning involves three inter-related activities: 1) 
connecting together different things; 2) realizing the significance that grows out of these 
connections; 3) making the behavior real to myself. Cavell describes this third activity as 
“bearing the right internal relation to others”(1999, 378). Soul blindness, in Cavell’s 
sense, is however much more specific than aspect blindness; it does not entail that that 
the soul blind person cannot see another as something (continuous aspect perception) 
nor that they cannot move from seeing another as x and then as y (aspect change). It 
entails only that they cannot see the other as human, that is, as en-souled, where the 
concept of ‘soul’ draws attention to the character of human beings as beings whose 
conduct gives expression to the inner lives that they have. 
 
What is at stake in soul blindness? Cavell considers the case of slavery, arguing that the 
failure of the slave-owner to take the slave as human demonstrates that the slave-owner 
‘is … missing something about himself, or rather something about his connection with 
these people, his internal relations with them, so to speak.’ (Cavell 1999, 376). The idea 
of bearing an internal relation with others as being an important part of one’s humanity 
is key here. One should not be misled by the use of the phrase ‘internal relation’ here. It 
does not refer to an inner mental process (knowing, believing, thinking) but rather to an 
attitude towards the other as en-souled that is manifest in one’s practical engagement 
with the other. Not seeing someone as human is seen as a lack for Cavell – the individual 
who cannot see the humanity in others thereby betrays a failure of their own humanity. It 
is a failure in four important ways.   
 
First, soul blindness entails a failure to be struck by the other’s humanity in a way that is 
analogous to Wittgenstein’s discussion of the individual who lacks the ability to notice an 
aspect. Cavell imagines the slave-owner saying of the slaves that they are ‘not human 
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beings’ and ask what he could mean by this, given that ‘[e]verything in his relation to his 
slaves shows that he treats them as more or less human’:  
When he wants to be served at table by a black hand, he would not be satisfied to 
be served by a black paw. When he rapes a slave or takes her as a concubine, he 
does not feel that he has, by that fact itself, embraced sodomy. When he tips a 
black taxi driver (something he never does with a white driver) it does not occur 
to him that he might have more appropriately patted the creature fondly on the 
side of the neck (Cavell 1999, 376). 
Cavell’s response is that the slave-owner ‘means, and can mean, nothing definite’: 
This is a definite state of mind. He means, indefinitely, that they are not purely 
human. He means, indefinitely, that there are kinds of humans. … He means, 
indefinitely, that slaves are different, primarily different from him, secondarily 
perhaps different from you and me. … In the end he will appeal to history, to a 
form, or rather to a way, of life: this is what he does. … It could be said that 
what he denies is that the slave is “other”, i.e., other to his one. They are, as it 
were, merely other; not simply separate, but different. It could also be said that he 
takes himself to be private with respect to them, in the end unknowable by them 
(Cavell 1999, 376–7). 
What the slave-owner thereby denies, as Raymond Gaita puts it, is “that the slave has his 
kind (the slave-owner’s kind) of individuality – the kind of individuality that shows itself 
in our revulsion in being numbered rather than called by name and that gives human 
beings the power to haunt those who have wronged them, in remorse” (Gaita 1991, 156).  
  
Second, overcoming soul blindness requires coming to stand in “the right internal 
relationship to others” (Cavell 1999, 378). Just as nothing changes in a picture-object 
when I come to see it as the object it represents, only something in terms of how I 
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practically relate to that picture-object, soul blindness consists in the perceiver not 
standing in the right internal relationship toward the other. Justice requires, most 
fundamentally, a person standing the right kind of internal relation towards the other.5 
Unlike those approaches to justice that see the problem in these cases as a problem of 
knowledge, Cavell sees justice in these cases as requiring acknowledgment.6 Cavell argues 
that if we treat our failures in our relations towards others as failures of knowledge, then 
we leave these relations vulnerable to our doubts about our knowledge of others and of 
ourselves. Conversely, acknowledgment involves not what you know about something, 
but how you respond and relate to that thing. In the case of inter-personal relations, 
knowing that someone lives next to me does not make him my neighbor rather this 
requires taking up a reciprocal relation to him: “if one is to acknowledge another as one’s 
neighbor, one must acknowledge oneself as his or her neighbor” (Cavell 1999, 434). It is 
important to be clear about the character of the concept of acknowledgment here. Cavell 
remarks: 
So when I say that ‘We must acknowledge another’s suffering, and we do that by 
responding to a claim upon our sympathy.’ I do not mean that we always in fact 
have sympathy, nor that we always ought to have it. The claim of suffering may go 
unanswered. We may feel lots of things – sympathy, Schadenfreude, nothing. If one 
says this is a failure to acknowledge another’s suffering, surely this would not 
mean that we fail in such cases to know he is suffering? It may or may not. The 
point, however, is that the concept of acknowledgment is evidenced equally by its 
failure as by its success. It is not a description of a given response but a category in 
terms of which a given response is evaluated. (It is the sort of concept Heidegger 
calls an existentiale.)” (Cavell 2002, 263–4) 
Soul blindness is not a failure of acknowledgment in the sense instanced by an 
unsympathetic response to the suffering of another as a claim on our sympathy. Rather it 
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is a failure to see the suffering of another as making a claim on our sympathy of the same 
kind that our own suffering would do so. It is a failure to see their suffering as suffering 
of the same kind as our own. It may be helpful here to introduce briefly a further 
example explored by Gaita concerning James Isdell, Protector of Aborigines in Western 
Australia in the 1930s, who administered a programme in which children of mixed blood 
were (typically forcibly) removed from the Aboriginal mothers ‘and placed in 
circumstances in which (it was hoped) most of them would have children with lower 
class whites’: 
Responding to the question, how did he feel taking children from their mothers, 
Isdell answered that he ‘would not hesitate from a moment to separate any half-
caste from its Aboriginal mother, no matter how frantic her momentary grief 
might be at the time’. They ‘soon forget their offspring’, he explained (Gaita 
1991, 332). 
As Gaita remarks, these words, coming from Isdell, ‘marked his sense of the kind of gulf 
that existed between “them” and “us”. “Our” children are irreplaceable; “theirs” are not.’ 
(Gaita 1991, 333). Isdell was not ignorant of the facts concerning the victims of his 
actions, rather ‘he suffered a kind of blindness to the meaning of what they did and 
suffered’: 
Although the grief of the women who had lost their children was visible and 
audible to him, he did not see in the women’s faces or hear in their voices grief 
that could lacerate their souls and mark them for the rest of their days. It was 
literally unintelligible to … Isdell that sexuality, death and the fact that at any 
moment we may lose all that gives sense to our lives could mean to ‘them’ what it 
does to ‘us’ (Gaita 1991, 333–4). 
Isdell could not see that ‘their’ loves, griefs, joys, and desires go deep in ‘them’ and have 
depth in the same way that they do for ‘us’. It is not that Isdell necessarily lacks 
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sympathy, it is rather that he cannot see the suffering of these Aboriginal women as 
having the same kind of claim on his sympathy as the suffering of, for example, White 
Australians. 
 
Third, soul blindness involves what Cavell describes as “inhabiting a particular 
Weltanschauung” (1999, 378). By this he means that those who take other human beings to 
be slaves have a fundamentally different world-view from those who do not. Because 
each way of taking the individual (as either a human being or a slave) involves not just 
one’s relation towards the other, but one’s practical relationship towards the society and 
social institutions in which and through which one relates to the other, the soul blind 
individual inhabits a different world from the one who can see another’s soul, that is, the 
‘worldhood’ of the world is both distinct and incommensurable for soul seeing and soul 
blind persons. These two worlds occlude each other. And a particular kind of politics is 
involved in attempting to bring about the kind of aspect dawning required to address the 
condition of soul blindness.  
 
Finally, in order to overcome soul blindness one must come to be struck by the world, 
and by oneself, in a particular way that is expressed in how one practically engages with 
the world and with oneself (Cavell 1999, 378). This experience of being struck by 
something is the experience of soul dawning. In relation to the soul blind person, the 
political challenge is not one of offering normative reasons or empirical facts but, rather, 
one of giving expression to the claims of those who are not seen as equal members of 
humanity in a way that enables the soul blind person to undergo soul dawning. This task 
of world-disclosure is nicely captured by Rancière’s view that “politics is both argument and 
opening up the world where argument can be received and have an impact” (1999, 56) 
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and to develop our account of the politics of soul-dawning, we turn now to the work of 
Rancière.   
 
II 
Wittgenstein describes aspect-blindness as the inability to be struck by the immediate 
expressiveness of a picture-object. As we have noted, Cavell’s reflections on soul 
blindness addresses how one may fail to be struck by, and so deny, the other as ‘other to 
his one’: “They are, as it were, merely other: not simply separate, but different” (1999, 
377). At this stage in our argument, we introduce the work of Jacques Rancière into this 
philosophical investigation of soul blindness. Although he does not use these terms, we 
hold that Rancière’s work perspicuously addresses the import of seeing aspects and soul 
blindness for political theory.7  
 
Rancière draws a useful formal distinction between politics and police.8 He elucidates the 
concept of ‘police’ as, “an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, 
ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a 
particular place and task” (Rancière 1999, 29). He links the concept of a police to the 
realm of the sensible by describing policing “as a rule governing [the] appearing [of 
bodies]” (Rancière 1999, 29). A police order is constitutive of, and constituted by, what 
Rancière calls “a distribution of the sensible” (1999, 29). By this he means that the police 
is an evaluative and normative ordering of what is apprehended by the senses – both in 
the sense of what is visible/invisible, audible/inaudible or sayable/unsayable and in the 
closely related sense of what is visible as what or audible as what or sayable as what. The 
distribution of the sensible thus refers to an order of continuous aspect perception 
(where ‘perception’ stands for the senses more generally). It is this focus on seeing 
aspects that discloses the sense in which Rancière speaks of aesthetics as being at the 
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core of politics. Rancière defines ‘politics’ as “whatever shifts a body from the place 
assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business 
being seen, and makes heard a discourse what was once only heard as noise” (1999, 30). 
Politics in this formal sense necessarily takes the form of aspect-change. This aspectival 
character of politics explains some otherwise potentially puzzling features of Rancière’s 
discussion of politics. 
  
Consider Rancière’s insistence that politics is “primarily conflict over the existence of a 
common stage”:  
It must first be established that the stage exists for the use of an interlocutor who 
can’t see it and who can’t see it for good reason because it doesn’t exist. Parties do 
not exist prior to the conflict they name and in which they are counted as parties. 
(1999: 27) 
The staging of politics requires aspect-change in order that what is seen as an issue of, 
say, misfortune can appear as a claim of injustice and, in so doing, constitute the parties 
to this dispute as parties to a dispute. Aspect-change is the necessary condition of the 
constitution of a common world (in Cavell’s sense) within which the claim of injustice 
becomes intelligible as such a claim. Politics in this sense always appears to involve a 
double movement in eliciting aspect-change - both (1) a dis-identification of “the part of 
those with no part” (Rancière 1999, 30) with the existing order of continuous aspect 
perception and (2) the exemplification of a world in which the distinction between those 
who have a part and those who have no part is erased.  
 
To develop and ground these claims concerning the salience of the concepts of 
continuous aspect perception and aspect change for Rancière’s police/politics distinction 
and, hence, the claim that Rancière provides one route for drawing out the import of 
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these concepts for political theory, we will consider the case of the First Plebian 
Secession from the Roman Republic in 494 BCE. The plebian secession initially began as 
a protest by the plebs over their debts to the ruling class. When the Senate refused to 
listen to the plebian demands, one of the plebs, Lucius Sicinius Vellutus, recommended 
that the plebs secede from Rome by leaving the city en masse and camping on hills 
outside the city. The Senate attempted to resolve the crisis by dispatching a former 
consul, Agrippa Menenius Lanatus, to negotiate with the plebs. In Livy’s account of the 
events, Menenius resolved the crisis by delivering an apologia to the plebs about how all 
the different parts of the body must work together in order for the body to survive. His 
implied message was that the plebs and patricians were separate parts of the same body 
(Rome), and in order for the Republic to survive the two classes must work together. 
The agreement the patricians and plebs reached was to create a new class of magistrates 
called the Tribunes to represent the interests of the plebians.9 In Disagreement Rancière 
analyzes not only Livy’s account but also a second account by the 19th century counter-
revolutionary French historian Pierre-Simon Ballanche (1829). Rancière notes that in 
Ballanche’s account the secession of the plebs is “a restaging of the conflict in which the 
entire issue at stake involves finding out whether there exists a common stage where 
plebians and patricians can debate anything” (1999, 23). Three features of Rancière’s 
treatment of this exemplary confrontation are salient to our current concerns. 
 
The first is the speech that Ballanche attributes to the Consul Appius Claudius (who 
favoured using force to crush the plebians) concerning the report of Menenius that words 
were issuing from the mouths of the plebs when logically the only thing that could issue 
forth was noise: 
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They have speech like us, they dared tell Menenius! Was it a god that shut 
Menenius’s mouth, that dazzled his eyes, that made his ears ring? Did some holy 
daze take hold of him? … He was somehow unable to respond that they had 
only transitory speech, a speech that is fugitive sound, a sort of lowing, a sign of 
want and not an expression of intelligence. They were deprived of the eternal 
word which was in the past and would be in the future.’ (Ballanche 1829, 94; 
cited in Rancière 1999, 24). 
This speech is the response of someone situated within an order of continuous aspect 
perception for whom the plebian is one kind of human being, namely, the kind of human 
being who lacks logos and whose individual existence leaves no trace other than 
instantiated through biological reproduction. Claudius’s speech act is an immediate 
reaction to a report of an event to have occurred for which there is simply no logical 
space within his Weltanschauung. As Rancière observes: 
This verdict does not simply reflect the obstinacy of the dominant or their 
ideological blindness; it strictly expresses the sensory order that organizes their 
domination, which is that domination itself (1999, 24).  
As a factual report, Menenius’ account cannot mean anything determinate to the 
patricians. Hence Claudius’ felt requirement to offer an explanation of this senselessness 
that is compatible with the order of continuous aspect perception that the patricians 
inhabit (e.g., sensory illusion).  
 
The similarity between of Appius Claudius’ response to Menenius’ report and Cavell’s 
discussion of the figure of the slave-owner is striking. If a slave-owner were to 
announces to his peers that slaves have the same kind of individuality as slave-owners, 
the immediate response by other slave owners would be that he was not “in his right 
senses” and for the same kind of reasons. The implication of Rancière’s reading of the 
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secession of the plebs is that soul blindness is constitutive of police order. Rancière’s 
formal concept of “the part who have no part” (plebians in this example, slaves in 
Cavell’s example)10 thus denotes those to whom soul blindness is exhibited.  
 
The second salient feature of Rancière’s example is the soul-dawning of Menenius in 
relation to the plebs. It is this that drew Appius Claudius’ response. The apologia that 
Menenius delivers to the plebs asserting the legitimacy of the rule of the patricians on the 
grounds that the plebs are “nameless” beings lacking “logos” involves a performative 
contradiction.  The act of delivering the apologia necessarily attributes the capacities for 
logos that the content of the apologia denies: “The apologia implies an inegalitarian 
partition of the perceptible. The sense necessary to understand this division presupposes 
an egalitarian division that puts paid to the former, but only the deployment of a specific 
scene of revelation gives this equality any effectiveness” (Rancière 1999, 25). This action 
thus serves to ‘light up’ the relation between patricians and plebs pronounced in the 
apologia as an inequality between equals, as an inequality whose justification is 
undermined by the very act of offering a justification. The performative contradiction of 
the apologia is exposed by the plebian response to it: “they listen politely and thank him 
but only so they can then ask him for a treaty” (Rancière 1999, 25). The important point 
here is that the plebs represent themselves to each other by conducting themselves “like 
beings with names”. The plebs constitute themselves as an exemplar of an-other police 
order, they make actual another police order. This mode of action elicits aspect change in 
Menenius. When Menenius delivers his apologia, this act acknowledges the very thing 
that it purports to deny: the plebians are being with names. In performing this act, 
Menenius sees himself through their eyes and they see themselves through his. Notice 
that acknowledgment, as we have stressed, is an attitude towards the other, a practical 
engagement with them expressed in bodily performances (e.g., words, gestures, spatial 
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postures of standing before a group and addressing them).11 Through his performative 
acknowledgment of the plebians as beings with names, the souls of the plebians dawn for 
Menenius and a new world exemplified by the police order they enact becomes visible 
and tangible to him. 
 
The third feature of the secession of the plebs is that the act of instituting an-other police 
order is an act of politics (in Rancière’s sense) only insofar as it succeeds in establishing a 
new order of continuous aspect perception for the plebians and creating the conditions 
of eliciting aspect-change in the patricians. This matters for how we conceive of political 
action. We can distinguish between two forms of activity in that police operates within a 
common world, whereas politics has to constitute a common world. Rancière’s theory of 
political action may be that of part-taking without legitimacy, without qualifications, and 
without expectations but this characterization only underscores the point that political 
action cannot force aspect-change. In enacting the improper egalitarian logic of taking a 
propriety (property of status, or mode of decorum) that does not belong to them, the 
political action of the plebians discloses a world in which the distinction marked by the 
propriety is erased and thus may elicit aspect-change – there can be no security or 
guarantee of success for such “democratic takers” (Honig 2003, 79).   
 
Having grounded our claim concerning the relationship of Rancière’s discussion of 
police and politics to Wittgenstein on seeing aspects and Cavell on soul blindness, we are 
now in a position to clarify an important point concerning Rancière’s use of the concept 
of equality and his insistence that equality is the condition of politics. By equality, 
Rancière does not mean a substantive principle that can be stated independently and in 
advance of the particular disputes within which it is manifest (1999: 33). Instead, by 
equality Rancière means “the pure empty quality of equality between anyone and 
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everyone” (Rancière 1999, 35). The denial of this kind of equality is a constitutive 
dimension of soul-blindness. As Cavell observes, the soul-blind slave-owner does not 
(and cannot) deny that slaves are human beings as such. Instead, the slave owner denies 
the humanity of slaves by asserting “they are not purely human”, instead “that they are 
kinds of human” (Cavell 1999, 376). The slave owner inscribes inequality of this sort by 
simultaneously acknowledging that the slave is a human (in the sense of being part of the 
species homo sapiens) and denying the slave’s humanity (in the sense of saying that he is 
not part of the same ethical and political order). As Cavell observes, it is “to deny just 
this that Marx, adapting Feuerbach’s theology, speaks of man as a species-being. To be 
human is to be one of humankind, to bear an internal relation to all others” (Cavell 1999, 
376). The egalitarian logic to which Rancière, like Marx, adverts is that of standing in an 
internal relation to the other as other to my one or, in the first person plural, other to our 
one.12 Because Rancière conceives of equality in this sense, he speaks of it as “a mere 
“assumption” that needs to be discerned within the practices implementing it” (1999, 
31). When Rancière speaks of democracy as the improper principle of politics marked by 
the absence of every title to govern, he means that to acknowledge one another as equals 
is to acknowledge that anyone at all can occupy the positions of governor and of 
governed. Conversely, any police order is characterized by criteria marking out those 
who have title to rule and those who do not. This discussion of Rancière provides a way 
of explicating the import of seeing aspects and soul blindness for political theory, but to 
ground the value of this general theoretical discussion, we turn now to a specific 
exemplification of the type of injustice and kind of politics that our analysis of soul 
blindness aims to make visible.  
 
III 
	 16 
In this section we consider the BLM movement and the White response to it in light of 
our analysis of aspect perception, soul blindness and police in the previous two sections. 
If, as we have argued, police orders are constituted through soul blindness and politics, in 
Rancière’s sense of the term, necessarily involves the effort to bring about soul dawning 
and, thus, giving specific practical instantiation to the most basic sense of equality, then 
BLM can be read as a contemporary political example of this political dynamic. To take 
up this task, recall the quotation from Cavell that serves as an epigraph to this paper 
(Cavell 1999, 372). There are at least three salient features of these remarks. First, one 
kind of claim to justice, the first and most basic, is the claim to be a subject of justice, 
that is the claim for acknowledgment as an member of humankind. Second, being human 
in the relevant sense is not just a predicate that one ascribes or not to others on the basis 
of empirical evidence but a matter of how we stand to each other. Third, it is a call for 
the group that “must suffer change” to undergo a change in attitude towards the other in 
which they come to perceive the internal relation between themselves and others as 
members of humanity. It is important to note, however, that this change in attitude 
cannot be either voluntary in the sense of being something that can be brought about 
through an act of volitional willing or forced in the sense of compelled by external agents. 
This change in attitude is something that is practiced; it is both evidenced through and 
constituted by a change in the mode of practical engagement with the other. 
 
Our claim in this section is that Black Lives Matter is a call for justice of this 
fundamental kind that is continuous with the basic demand evidenced in the history 
African American struggle in the USA and expressed by Baldwin in the Civil Rights era: 
Negroes want to be treated like men: a perfectly straightforward sentence, containing 
only seven words. People who have mastered Kant, Hegel, Shakespeare, Marx, 
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Freud and the Bible find this statement utterly impenetrable. The idea seems to 
threaten profound, barely conscious assumptions (Baldwin 1991, 64–5).13 
BLM is a response to a police order constituted through a racialized form of soul 
blindness. It critiques an order of continuous racial perception enacted in and through 
everyday practices of racecraft. The hashtag #BlackLivesMatter is an exclamation, a 
complex avowal, that may be, at once, an expression of pain, of anger, of indignation, of 
resilience and, even perhaps, of hope. It is also a reminder that within the police orders 
that compose the history of the United States of America, black lives have not, or have 
only exceptionally, been seen as mattering, as of account, in the same way as white lives14 
– and that this condition is a product not of the black community but rather of those 
who see themselves as white15 and, more specifically, of their becoming white.16  
 
However, one may also fail to be struck by the connections expressed in the avowal 
#BlackLivesMatter This failure to be struck is evidenced in a common mode of response 
from the community of those who see themselves as white that is expressed in the 
hashtag #AllLivesMatter. The fact of this response is important, we suggest, because it 
evidences the very phenomenon of racialised soul blindness to which the Black Lives 
Matter movement seeks to draw attention. Those who respond to #BlackLivesMatter 
with #AllLivesMatter may mean different things by this response. They may mean that 
#BlackLivesMatter is a racialized and hence divisive, even racist, speech act. This for 
instance is the view of Mike Huckabee, who said in an interview on CNN: 
“When I hear people scream, ‘black lives matter,’ I think, of course they 
do. … But all lives matter. It’s not that any life matters more than 
another. . . .That’s the whole message that Dr. King tried to present, and 
I think he’d be appalled by the notion that we’re elevating some lives 
above others” (Ehley 2015). 
	 18 
In responding to the movement, Huckabee claims to acknowledge the value of black life, 
but then rejects the movement on the grounds that the avowal #BlackLivesMatter is 
valuing black lives over other (presumably white) lives. This response to BLM exposes 
the problem with difference blind approaches to racial integration. Unlike the anti-
integration and pro-segregation rhetoric of U.S. conservatives in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s, conservatives today have co-opted civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King 
and calls for racial equality in the name of closing down contemporary claims for racial 
justice. Just as Appius Claudius was unable to comprehend how the plebs could have 
speech like us (Rancière 1999, 24), Huckabee is unable to comprehend how a claim such 
as #BlackLivesMatter is anti-racist. Huckabee’s response is an expression of soul 
blindness, it evidences his inability to understand how a demand to acknowledge the 
value of Black lives and the end of their legalized killing by the police is, in a fundamental 
way, a demand by the Black community to have equal standing to speak and act in 
American political life. 
 
A second use of #AllLivesMatter comes from white liberal Americans. For instance, at 
the 2015 Netroots Conference, Presidential candidate Martin O’Malley responded to a 
direct action by #BlackLivesMatter activists with the statement: “Black lives matter, 
white lives matter, all lives matter” (Dayen 2015). The description of the response, at the 
same event, when another Presidential candidate, Senator Bernie Sanders was confronted 
by protestors, is equally telling: 
“ ‘I spent 50 years of my life fighting for civil rights and dignity,’ he said, 
alluding to his time as an organizer for the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee in the 1960s and his marching with Rev. Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr. Even so, he pivoted away from every criminal 
justice question by returning to economics” (Dayen 2015). 
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The problem with these liberal responses to BLM is that they respond to the demand of 
the social movement as if it were a matter of liberal principles of equality. O’Malley in his 
first response to the activists chants took the claim that #BlackLivesMatter as simply a 
demand for black lives to be valued before the law in the same way as white lives. This is 
an example of what Rancière means of confusing equality as a principle with “the empty 
quality of equality between anyone and everyone” (Rancière 1999, 35). O’Malley and 
Sanders respectively misread BLM as a demand for either equality before the law (i.e. a 
politics of recognition) or economic equality (i.e. a politics of redistribution). In this way 
they take what we might call the ideal of the current police order as acceptable, all that 
needs to be done is make the police order live up to its ideal.17 To declare 
“#AllLivesMatter!” in this situation is a form of soul blindness because it does not 
acknowledge how the current police order, the one the protestors are challenging, 
asymmetrically enables police brutality against black Americans: “The system isn’t 
broken, it was built this way” as Ferguson protestors argued.  
 
One way of reading these protests at the Netroots Nation conference is as an attempt by 
the activists to elicit soul dawning in white liberals. Goldie Taylor, one of the participants 
in the Netroots direct action observed: “What Sanders should have done, when they said 
‘Sandra Bland,’ you say ‘Sandra Bland!’” (Dayen 2015).18	Notice that the primary request 
of the activists was not understood at all by Sanders or O’Malley – and both responded 
initially as though confronted by a personal accusation, becoming defensive and listing 
their civil rights credentials. Rather than recognizing that the protestors wanted the 
candidates to listen to the protests, to make space on the stage for them to voice their 
demands in their own terms (whether or not they would then have assented to these 
requests), O’Malley’s and Sanders’ responses avoid acknowledgment of the protestors by 
assimilating BLM protestors to their own perspective. This prevents the construction of 
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a common stage (in Rancière’s terms). The character of this failure of understanding by 
the politicians reveals a fundamental perfomative contradiction in the declaration 
#AllLivesMatter. By responding in this way, the politicians expose the failure behind 
their protestations of commitment to racial equality. #AllLivesMatter is an avoidance of 
acknowledging the protestors’ voice. This avoidance reveals that the politicians do not 
see the point of granting equal standing to the protestors in the articulation of the terms 
of political discourse. While these protests are instances of politics in Rancière’s sense of 
the term, the temporary spaces that they open up are quickly foreclosed when the cry 
#BlackLivesMatter is rebuffed with #AllLivesMatter. While the protestors can create 
new spaces that disrupt police orders through their actions, unless the targets of their 
actions respond to the protests with a moment of soul dawning, then the existing police 
order remains intact. 
 
What would soul dawning by a white politician look like? To address this question, let’s 
consider a third instance of BLM protestors confronting a prominent white liberal 
politician: Hillary Clinton. In a video taped meeting between BLM activists and Clinton, 
Clinton listens for several minutes to the activists speech, thus letting them guide the 
conversation. When one of the activists points out that her family played a significant 
role in the rise in mass incarceration in the U.S. in the 1990s, Clinton responds: 
Your analysis is totally fair. It’s historically fair. It’s psychologically fair. 
It’s economically fair. But you’re going to have to come together as a 
movement and say ‘Here’s what we want done about it.’ (Lopez 2015). 
Unlike O’Malley and Sanders, Clinton does not avoid the protestor’s calls for justice by 
trying to re-inscribe the movement under a general principle of legal equality (as 
O’Malley did) or a distinct call for economic redistribution (as Sanders did). And in 
acting thus, she creates a space for the activists to voice their concerns. However, her 
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response is not one of soul dawning. Rather she is like a person who is shown how one 
could take the duck-rabbit as a duck, and acknowledges the possibility of such an 
inference (i.e. “Your analysis is totally fair”), yet she is still unable to see the image as a 
duck. This gap is revealed when one of the activists responds to her: 
I say this as respectfully as I can, but if you don’t tell black people what 
we need to do, then we won’t tell you all what you need to do. This is and 
has always been a white problem of violence. There’s not much we can 
do to stop the violence against us . . . What you just said was a form of 
victim blaming. You were saying what the Black Lives Matter needs to do 
to change white hearts is a policy change. (Lopez 2015) 
The activist’s point is that the ones who “must suffer change” (Cavell 1999, 372) are the 
white community. While Black Lives Matter protests can expose the contradictions 
within white liberalism’s claims to equality and open up spaces where their arguments 
can be received and have an impact, real change requires soul dawning. It requires the 
soul blind whites of America to change their internal relations to, and thus their mode of 
practical engagement with, blacks.19  
 
Clinton’s response fails to see the distinct and fundamental injustice to which the 
protestors are seeking to draw attention and hence to grasp the kind of politics that 
addressing it requires. “Look, I don’t believe you change hearts. I believe you change 
laws, you change allocation of resources, you change the way systems operate” (Lopez 
2015). In saying this, Clinton closes down the space that the activists had opened up and 
effectively re-inscribes the BLM movement as simply another (albeit important) interest 
group lobbying a politician for resources and legislative action. Yet this is a categorical 
error on the part of Clinton. Not every political movement is a liberal interest group 
movement. And not every justice claim focuses simply on resource redistribution or legal 
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recognition. While Black Lives Matter activists have formulated specific political 
demands, the possibility of overcoming the condition that gives rise to the problem 
addressed by such specific demands requires a more radical change in the attitudes and, 
therefore, practices of white Americans must take place, as the activist speaking to 
Clinton makes clear. So long as the white majority in the US is soul blind to the suffering 
and brutality that black Americans face not just in the US criminal justice system but in 
American social and political life more generally, the police order that finds its expression 
in this suffering and brutality will remain in place even if the particular forms and 
locations of the individual and institutional expression of soul blindness may change.  
 
It is important to be clear here that we are not claiming that changing laws, allocations of 
resources and the ways that systems operate are not important. On the contrary, these 
may be crucial to cultivating conditions that support the widespread emergence of soul-
dawning, a social awakening to the reality of racial injustice. Thus, for example, Elizabeth 
Anderson’s (2013) analysis of black-white inequality across social, economic and political 
indices as a form of ‘durable inequality’ points to the importance of spatial and role 
integration as conditions that breakdown stigmatizing stereotypes and the conditions of 
their formation. In our terms, such a practice of integration cultivates responsiveness and 
facilitates soul dawning as a social phenomenon among the population that see 
themselves as white. Rather our point is twofold. First, that soul dawning and the change 
of attitude through which it is expressed is not a functional output of such social and 
political policies, nor an automatic byproduct of their successful implementation. 
Second, that soul dawning is a necessary condition of the realization of racial justice, of 
practices of mutual engagement within which the terms of racial justice can be worked 
out. However, it is important to add a further point here. We have stressed that a change 
in attitude is also a change in practices, in one’s practical relationship to oneself and 
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others. This point matters because such changes, even at very local levels, can give rise to 
social practices through which participants experience, and new participants acquire the 
capability for, continuous soul perception. BLM may be understood not only as a protest 
against the fundamental form of injustice that is racialised soul blindness but also, at the 
same time, as an invitation to enter into and engage in such practices. 
 
Each of the three responses to #BlackLivesMatter that we have considered evidences the 
very phenomenon to which this avowal seeks to draw attention, but they also illustrate a 
further more specific point, namely, the difficulty of seeking to draw attention to forms 
of soul blindness in a context where the ideology of the police order enshrines a mode of 
reflection of itself that takes the form of what Jacob Levy acutely characterized as ‘folk 
ideal theory’:  
It is taken for granted that there is some meaningful and noncoincidental overlap 
between what the speaker thinks states are normatively supposed to do … and 
what they do. So if a suspected shoplifter gets shot to death by a cop or a 
member of a crowd outside a store with broken windows gets beaten by a cop, 
the wrong on one side is accepted a priori (people shouldn’t steal stuff or break 
stuff) while the wrong on the other is treated as an open question, and an 
aberration from the norm. … State abuses are always, in a basic sense, seen as 
aberrations from the norm. Indeed, the norm is seen as the norm: the normative is 
normal, and vice-versa. (Levy 2015). 
In our terms, the problem to which Levy draws attention is that, in a police order that 
reflects on itself in this way, and especially one whose official ideal is that of respect for 
the moral dignity of all persons, it is immensely difficult for the very idea that this police 
order is itself constituted in part by a form of soul blindness to gain traction. The 
admitting of this possibility would entail acknowledging that the story that white America 
	 24 
tells about itself about its ideals is, in a very real sense, an ideological obsfuscation, a 
form of motivated self-deception, that it is not a case of white America failing in some 
institutional context or other to lives up to its ideals, rather it is one of failing to hold 
these ideals, of not actually being committed to these ideals. This is the biting point of 
Baldwin’s remark that white Americans ‘are, in effect, still trapped in a history which they 
do not understand; and until they understand it, they cannot be released from 
it.’(Baldwin 1990b, 16–7) 
 
Conclusion 
In this article we have aimed to recover the salience of Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
seeing aspects and Cavell’s reflections on soul blindness for political theory. Integral to 
this recovery was our analysis of Rancière’s work on police and politics in which we 
argued that police orders are orders of continuous aspect perception marked by soul-
blindness and that politics necessarily involves aspect-change and the phenomenon of 
soul dawning. We have argued Ranciere’s concept of ‘the part that has no part’ denotes 
those to whom soul blindness is exhibited and his radical concept of equality highlights 
the centrality of standing in internal relations to one another as members of humankind. 
We put this analysis to work through an account of BLM as a movement that draws 
attention to the mutual constitution of a racialised police order and racialised form of 
soul blindness – and of particular type of response to BLM as exhibiting the very 
phenomenon of fundamental injustice against which its protest is directed. A central 
point for our discussion is that the kind of politics required to address soul blindness 
cannot solely take the discursive form of adducing facts and reasons or the practical form 
of legal recognition or economic redistribution, rather it requires a fundamental shift in 
the attitudes and perceptions of those who are soul blind. Those who are marginalized 
via soul blindness, be it Rancière’s example of the plebians or Cavell’s example of the 
slaves or our example of the black population of America, can stage events that try to 
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elicit soul dawning (under conditions that are more or less enabling of the kind of 
responsiveness required). As Rancière points out, “politics is both argument and opening 
up the world where argument can be received and have an impact” (1999, 56). Yet, as 
most recently exhibited by BLM protests such as “Hands up don’t shoot”, “I can’t 
breathe”, or direct actions such as the Black Brunch20, whether or not these actions elicit 
the response that the activists seek is ultimately out of their hands. Constructing a 
common stage is not something can be forced. While soul dawning is possible at any 
given time, the precise moment of its occurrence, or even the actuality of its occurrence, 
is contingent on the capacity and disposition for responsiveness of the soul blind (which 
may be differentially enabled or obstructed by social, economic and political structures), 
and so not simply a matter of volitional willing for either the soul blind or those who are 
subject to soul blindness. At the same time, and to the extent that it emerges, the 
development of social practices of continuous soul perception provides a space through 
which a politics of soul dawning that acknowledges the humanity of others without 
erasing difference can be enacted. 
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 																																																								1An earlier version of this paper was presented at APSA 2015 and we are grateful for our 
fellow-panellists, audience members and particularly our discussant Tracy Strong for 
comments and suggestions. It has also been given at the 2nd Annual Critical Theory 
conference at the Centre for Philosophical Studies, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru 
and we’d like to thank all those present, especially Gianfranco Casuso, Sebastian Leon 
and Chris Zurn. It was also offered to an audience at the Philosophy Department, Texas 
A and M University and thanks are due especially to Daniel Conway, Claire Katz and 
colleagues for their helpful discussion of the issues raised. 
2 Wittgenstein’s initial interest in the paradox involves refuting two possible ways of 
resolving it. The first is a response appealing to physiology that attempts to explain 
aspect change as the result of a shift in eye movement patterns by saying dismissively 
that “the cause” of the phenomenon is “of interest to psychologists” where as 
philosophers “are interested in the concept and its place among the concepts of 
experience” (Wittgenstein 1973, sec. xi 193). To explain aspect shifts physiologically 
would avoid the question of what a shift in aspect perception is and its relationship to 
our conceptual experience. The second reponse that Wittgenstein wants to avoid 
involves asserting that that the appearance of paradox is the result of an internal mental 
process (1973, sec. xi 193), where this would rely on appeal to the incoherent idea of an 
inner copy of an image that somehow shifts even as the external image does not 
(Wittgenstein 1973, sec. xi 193). 
3 For political applications of this dimension of Wittgenstein’s thought, see (Owen 2003; 
Owen 2002)on the possibility of ‘aspectival captivity’ as distinct from ‘false 
consciousness’ and ‘ideological captivity. See (Havercroft 2011)  for aspectival captivity 
as it relates to discourses of sovereignty and (Havercroft 2003) for aspect perception and 
dawning as it relates to political theory debates over liberty. 
4 The scope may vary from a specific domain to all domains 
5 One of the few moral and political philosophers to pick up on the salience of Cavell’s 
discussion of soul-blindness is Rainer Forst, see (Forst, 2012, 41) 
6 Our distinction between recognition and acknowledge in this section draws heavily on 
Patchen Markell’s arguments on these matters in Bound by Recognition (2009, 32 – 38). 
7 Others have also explored some of the affinity between Cavell, Wittgenstein, and 
Rancière, albeit with different interests than those we take up. See most recently Panagia 
(2014) Frank (2015, 259)and Norval (2012). 
8 Racière’s distinction between politics and the police has led to competing 
interpretations in political theory. The anarchist reading, put forward by Todd May 
(2010; 2008) sees politics as displacing police, and that the ultimate goal is the permanent 
replacement of police order with a radical politics of freedom. Conversely, Sam 
Chambers argues that politics is always impure and disturbs police orders rather than 
replacing them (2011; 2014). For a critique of Chambers’ understanding of Racière’s 
politics see (Woodford 2014; Woodford 2015). 
9 These events are covered in Livy, History of Rome, book 2, section 22 – 34 (2002). 
10 See also Schaap (Schaap 2011) for an examination of this dimension of Rancière’s 
thought in relationship to Arendt (1973) and the “right to have rights”. 11	Our thanks to Jane Bennet for helping us to clarify this point.	
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12 See also Deranty (2003) who makes a similar point about Rancière in relation to Hegel 
and Honneth on recognition and Bull (2000) who links Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspect 
dawning to apocalypse theory and Hegel’s theory of recognition. 13	Baldwin’s use of the term ‘men’ may itself betray a lack of appreciation of the 
gendered and other dimensions of the problem of race in America but whether or not 
that is the case would require a fuller discussion of Baldwin’s work than we can provide 
here. 
14 Baldwin is again to the point, writing in his 1968 essay ‘Black Power’: 
America sometimes resembles, at least from the point of view of the black man, 
an exceedingly monotonous minstrel show; the same dances, same music, same 
jokes. One has done (or been) the show so long that one can do it in one’s sleep. 
(2010: 99) 
15 It is important to note here, with Charles Mill’s, that the Racial Contract is moral, 
political and epistemological. Its epistemological dimension prescribes norms for 
cognition that partition a society into a “white” hegemonic group and a “non-white” 
subordinate group (Mills 2011, 11). For the argument that race is a political construct 
that supports a cross-class alliance of domination for whites see Olson (Olson 2004). On 
the history of the social construction of race in general and whiteness in particular see 
Roediger (1991; 1994) and Ignatiev (Ignatiev 2008). 
16 As Baldwin notes: 
No one was white before he/she came to America. It took generations, and a vast 
amount of coercion, before this became a white country. … America became white – the 
people who, as they claim, “settled” the country became white – because of the necessity 
of denying the black presence, and justifying the black subjugation.  (2010: 167) 
The point is echoed by Coates: 
Americans believe in the reality of race as a defined, indubitable feature of the natural 
world. Racism ­ the need to ascribe bone-deep features to people and then humiliate, 
reduce, and destroy them ­ inevitably follows from this inalterable condition. In this way, 
racism is rendered as the innocent daughter of Mother Nature, and one is left to deplore 
the Middle Passage or the Trail of Tears the way one deplores an earthquake, a tornado, 
or any other phenomenon that can be cast as beyond the handiwork of men. … this is 
the new idea at the heart of these new people who have been brought up hopelessly, 
tragically, deceitfully, to believe that they are white. (2015, location 80 – 85). 
17 This evocation of #AllLivesMatter rests upon what Jacob Levy, writing in response to 
the Ferguson protests of 2014 called folk ideal theory. “There’s a phrase that gained 
popularity during the Ferguson protests last year: “The system isn’t broken; it was built 
this way.” (Ta-Nehisi Coates didn’t coin it, but he did some writing developing the idea 
in important ways.) The ideal theorist– professional or folk– has a very hard time with 
that thought. State abuses are always, in a basic sense, seen as aberrations from the norm. 
Indeed, the norm is seen as the norm: the normative is normal, and vice-versa” (Levy 2015). 
 
18 A second participant at the Netroots conference, Jana Zinzi made a similar 
observation: 
Can you imagine how the conversation and energy in the room could have changed if he 
just stopped and said, ‘I'm listening?’ That would have given the other white people the 
message that maybe something legitimate is being communicated and that they should 
actually listen, too. That would have showed real leadership and basic humanity. (Dayen 
2015). 
19 Baldwin makes just this point when he writes in his essay ‘The White Problem’: 
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The price of this transformation is high. White people will have to ask themselves 
precisely why they found it necessary to invent the nigger; the nigger is a white invention, 
and white people invented him out of terrible necessities of their own. And every white 
citizen of this country will have to accept the fact that he is not innocent … (2010: 97) 
He draws out the implication of this point about white America for the black community 
in his letter to his nephew in The Fire Next Time: 
There is no reason for you to try to become like white people and there is no basis 
whatever for their impertinent assumption that they must accept you. The really terrible 
thing, old buddy, is that you must accept them. . . . They are, in effect, still trapped in a 
history which they do not understand; and until they understand it, they cannot be 
released from it. (Baldwin 1990a, 16 – 17).  20	This was a protest by BLM activists in January 2015 that took the form of occupying 
predominantly white-patronised restaurants for Sunday Brunch and reading out the 
names of black victims of US police violence.		
